THE GERMAN LANDING IN KAKHETI: THE GEORGIANS IN THE WORLD WAR II

 

Tengiz Simashvili

The article was published; Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University,
Faculty of Humanities and Institute of Georgian History, Proceedings, Vol. XVII,
Tbilisi, 2021. 

THE GERMAN LANDING IN KAKHETI: THE GEORGIANS IN THE WORLD WAR II

 

East of the city of Telavi, next to Nadikvari Park, there is a small hill known as “Gigo’s Hill.” (During the Russian Empire, this area belonged to nobleman Gigo Vakhvakhishvili; accordingly, it came to be called “Gigo’s Hill.”) In the 1920s, residents of the Telavi district—mostly individuals unacceptable to Soviet authorities—were executed there. In August 1924, on charges of participating in the armed uprising, many inhabitants of Telavi were executed and buried right on “Gigo’s Hill.” (For those interested in the history of the 1924 repressions and the executions on “Gigo’s Hill” in Telavi, see my research: Tengiz Simashvili, “The Bloody September of 1924 in Telavi”, Works of the Faculty of Humanities and the Institute of Georgian History, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, vol. XVI, 2020.)

The last victim executed on “Gigo’s Hill” had no connection to the city of Telavi. However, local memory preserves an oral tradition that in the same place where the Soviet authorities carried out executions of Telavi residents in the 1920s, during the Second World War, in either 1942 or 1943, one member of a German paratrooper unit—air-dropped by plane—was executed. As is typical for such oral traditions, in the accounts of eyewitnesses and their descendants, many details coincide, while others vary to some extent. (In 2013, researcher Irakli Khvadagiani of the “Soviet Past Research Laboratory” recorded oral histories from Telavi residents on this topic, which I personally witnessed. “Gigo’s Hill - https://vimeo.com/122046995?fbclid=IwAR11pdnI1tnQH35eB6JflYKTz-jif8qnaHQprliJNp8HQJWxugj3rzW0UtU

In the memory of one eyewitness who personally witnessed the execution on “Gigo’s Hill,” the information was preserved that the person executed was a member of the “German paratroopers” by the surname Chirakadze. (This refers to one of the interviewees—Mr. Kako Sesikashvili.)

According to the accounts of other individuals, during the Second World War, a German aircraft dropped two men into the forest on Tsivi Mountain—the mountain slope on which the city of Telavi is located. One of them was a colonel, who sent his assistant from the forest into Telavi to obtain an antenna for the radio transmitter. However, the assistant went directly to the local NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Telavi branch), reported the colonel, and had him arrested.

Other residents of Telavi recall that news of the execution of a “German paratrooper” on “Gigo’s Hill” had been circulated in advance. Some say it was published in the newspaper; others claim that announcements were posted around the city. They also confirm that many people had gathered at the execution site on “Gigo’s Hill.”

In these oral traditions, the scene of the execution of a member of the “German paratroopers” on “Gigo’s Hill” during the Second World War is described in nearly identical terms. I should note one account, which I personally heard during my student years from my lecturer Vazha Khachidze: before the execution, when the sentence was read out and the order was given—“Death to the traitor of the homeland!”—Chirakadze, who stood handcuffed, wearing only a white shirt, managed to cry out: “I love Georgia; I am not a traitor. History will determine who the real traitor is!”

According to another oral history, after the sentence was pronounced, the condemned man—Chirakadze—shouted: “History will decide whether I am the traitor, or you are!”

Immediately after these words, a volley of gunfire rang out. Yet the shots could not obscure the Soviet authorities’ attempt to use this man’s execution for their ideological purposes. True, he was physically destroyed, but the people of Telavi did not see in him a spiritually broken, frightened, or terrified enemy. This is confirmed by the content of the above-cited oral histories. Moreover, the last words uttered by the executed man were preserved by eyewitnesses and their descendants, even decades later.

After the execution, the body of the deceased was thrown into a hastily dug grave at the site of the execution, covered with soil, and a small mound appeared on the southern slope of “Gigo’s Hill.” This story survived only as oral history in Telavi, because the mound marking the grave disappeared in the 1960s. (The construction of the “Givi Chokheli” football stadium and the planting of trees there completely altered the surrounding area. However, only a few years ago, thanks to one of the respondents of the above-mentioned oral history records, Mr. Arsen Kveliashvili, I was able to identify the approximate location of the grave.)

It was precisely this scarce yet tragic story that became, for me, the starting point in the search for information about this individual. This search ultimately led me to traces of the activities of the German Navy’s intelligence service in Georgia, namely the so-called Nachrichtenbeobachter (NBO).

The “Nachrichtenbeobachter” (abbreviated NBO), a naval intelligence unit, was established in late 1941 – early 1942 in Berlin. It was later transferred to Simferopol, where it was stationed until October 1943 at 6 Sevastopolskaya Street. The unit belonged to the Naval Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht’s supreme command intelligence and counterintelligence service (Abwehr). Operationally, this naval intelligence unit was directly subordinated to the “Abwehr-Abroad” division and was attached to Admiral Schuster’s staff, who commanded the German naval forces deployed in the Southeastern Basin. Until the end of 1943, the unit was assigned the field post number 47585, which is also confirmed by the materials of my research (see Document #1).

Until July 1942, this Abwehr naval intelligence subdivision was commanded by Navy Captain Bode, and from July 1942 onward—by Corvette Captain Rick(h)hof.

Along with other types of intelligence activities, this unit also recruited volunteers from among prisoners of war, who underwent special training in Simferopol and in schools and training grounds located in its surrounding areas. The trained and prepared agents were then sent in groups of three to four men “to work” behind the lines of the Red Army. Their deployment was carried out by airplanes, overland routes, or by sea with the use of boats. As a rule, each deployed group included a radio operator equipped with a portable transmitter. Communication with the agents was maintained through radio stations located in Kerch, Simferopol, and Anapa.

During the course of research, it was discovered that the German Army’s naval intelligence unit, the so-called Nachrichtenbeobachter (NBO), had “sent” several groups to Georgia. However, I will not discuss their composition and activities here. I will only note that the materials I have uncovered are quite interesting and call for further research.

It was precisely in the Simferopol intelligence camp of the German Army’s naval intelligence unit, the Nachrichtenbeobachter (NBO), that a group of Georgians was trained and subsequently “sent” by plane to Georgia, in Kakheti, on September 17, 1942.

This story I was able to document only after long years of research and searching. All that had been known was the surname of the man executed in Telavi—Chirakadze. However, in the central and local newspapers of 1942–1943, I could not find any information whatsoever. Only in the archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did I discover the NKVD’s investigative case, now filed as “archival case #42/1265” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vols. 1–5). Through the processing and analysis of this and other archival files, I was able to uncover various materials connected with our research subject and related individuals.

According to the above-mentioned archival case, on September 27, 1942, at 1 a.m., two men—Fitskhelauri and Batsatsashvili—appeared at the Telavi NKVD office. (For various reasons, in this research I mention only the surnames of the individuals directly involved in the case. One reason is that, in my view, no one today can say with certainty how a person would have acted in those times and circumstances, as it was a very difficult and brutal era. Another reason is that at present, the period is being studied and reassessed, and it is possible that the descendants of the people mentioned in the research may not wish to see their ancestors’ activities reinterpreted. Therefore, anyone wishing to obtain fuller information about the individuals mentioned in this study may turn to the appropriate archival institution.)

The so-called “detention report” states:
“The men who appeared declared that on September 17, 1942, they had been parachuted in by a German plane to carry out espionage and sabotage operations. Together with them, German Army Major, ‘émigré Chirakadze,’ and two former prisoners of war, Ebanidze and Durglishvili, had also been dropped; these men are currently located in the forest on the Gombori Pass.”
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 8)

According to this document, signed by the head of the Telavi NKVD, the head of the Telavi “Destruction Battalion” staff, and the commissar of the “Destruction Battalion” (these battalions were militarized volunteer formations of Soviet citizens created during the Second World War. They were mainly recruited from Party, Soviet, and trade union activists who were not subject to military conscription. Battalion members were allowed to carry weapons. They were tasked with fighting saboteurs, spies, deserters, bandits, and speculators behind the Red Army lines, as well as maintaining state and public order. Commanders of the battalions were appointed from the leadership of various Soviet institutions, primarily the NKVD. They were subordinated to the special headquarters of the NKVD of the respective republic).

The aforementioned men declared:
“They, along with two other former prisoners, had agreed even before flying to Georgia to report to the NKVD. Now they appeared in order to facilitate the capture of the émigré Chirakadze, who had been dropped together with them.”
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 8)

By the decision of the local NKVD leadership, on the morning of September 27, 1942, Fitskhelauri and Batsatsashvili, together with members of the Telavi NKVD and the “Destruction Battalion,” returned to the Gombori Mountains. The named individuals entered a hut in the forest near the village of Ashroshan, and at 12 noon, gunfire was heard. This was the signal, and when representatives of the Soviet security forces arrived at the site, they saw a handcuffed man lying on the ground. As was later established, he was Chirakadze. He had been restrained by Fitskhelauri, while Batsatsashvili and two other individuals sat nearby, waiting. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 9)

The handcuffed émigré Chirakadze was arrested along with the members of his group. All five were taken to Telavi and placed in cells within the NKVD building.

The detainees were interrogated on the same day—September 27. Their first interrogation protocols are dated precisely to this day. The case also contains interrogation records from other periods, as well as documentation of searches. The detainees had papers confiscated, including radio codes and documents filled out in Russian and German. (See Document #1) Among these were notebooks of Red Army soldiers with names, photographs with inscriptions, and weapons including submachine guns, pistols, German radio receivers, and other items. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 20)

Among the detainees, four were former prisoners of war—Ebanidze, Fitskhelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili. Based on their testimonies and those of Chirakadze, it is known that on the evening of September 17, 1942, they had departed by German aircraft from the so-called “Sakis” airfield near the city of Yevpatoria. The drop was supposed to occur near the village of Melania in Georgia, but because Soviet anti-aircraft fire near Tbilisi forced the German plane off course, the pilot lost his way, and they parachuted at 10 p.m. into the Ashroshan forest in the Gombori Pass area, which at the time was part of the Telavi district. (The Ashroshan forest is the same location where, in the distant 1920s, Kakutsa Cholokashvili and his “pledged men” took refuge in Kakheti.)

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Of the five-man “German paratrooper” group, the biographies of four former Soviet Red Army soldiers are very similar.

One of the first interrogation protocols, dated September 27, 1942—the day of their arrest—belongs to group member Ebanidze. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 20–41)

Analysis of this and other documents clearly shows that he was the most “active” and, as noted, the most “pro-Soviet-oriented” among the detainees. Furthermore, it can be said that Ebanidze “cooperated willingly” with the investigation. In addition to the interrogation protocols conducted by the investigator, several dozen pages of a statement-autobiography written on his own initiative are preserved in the archival file. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 71–111)

These materials provide a fairly detailed account of Ebanidze’s biography. He had graduated from a provincial pedagogical institute, where he studied in the Faculty of History and served as secretary of the faculty Komsomol committee. After completing the institute, he was sent to serve as the director of a village secondary school in the district. In his own words: “I have been a Komsomol member since 1927, in January 1941 I became a candidate for membership in the Communist Party, and I am still a party member today.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 72, 74)

In 1941, Ebanidze was appointed as editor of the district newspaper, from which he was soon drafted into the army in September 1941. His unit was initially stationed in the town of Tsulukidze (Khoni), where the regimental commissar and regimental commander summoned him and assigned him to study the radio operator’s work—as a trusted individual. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 72)

In a statement-autobiography written on his own initiative, Ebanidze writes: “Since 1940, I have been working in the district NKVD under the codename ‘Sarke’ (‘Mirror’). After being drafted into the army, I was known in the division under the name ‘Zerkala’ (the Russian word for ‘Mirror’). My handwritten records and the work I have done can be verified at the designated locations.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 73) (See Document #2)

Thus, Ebanidze was a typical NKVD agent—using the agent name “Sarke” in civilian life, and in the army known by the Russian equivalent “Zerkala.” Naturally, in addition to his party affiliation, this was the reason why the regimental commissar and commander trusted him. At that time, in Soviet army units, assigning a radio operator’s duties to a Komsomol member or Bolshevik Party member was a common practice. Furthermore, according to Ebanidze, he also served as an assistant to the regiment’s so-called “political leader” (Politkhel), a position in the Soviet armed forces responsible for exercising political control over unit commanders’ actions, conducting political education, and monitoring the moral “state” of the unit. Essentially, the political leader exercised political oversight over soldiers and officers.

Together with his military unit, where he simultaneously performed the duties of a radio operator and assistant to the political leader, Ebanidze was “transferred” from Georgia in December 1941 to the city of Sevastopol. Like other soldiers, he did not have direct contact with combat and was not assigned to the front lines. However, in May 1942, with the beginning of attacks by German and Romanian army units, by July 3, 1942, he and his unit were encircled along the coast and captured. Initially, he was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in the city of Bakhchisarai. Later, he was transferred to a POW camp in Simferopol, where conditions were poor—prisoners suffered from hunger and dysentery was widespread. According to Ebanidze, he became so weakened by hunger that he could not stand. At that time, “my regimental doctor came to me and said—‘You are going to die anyway, diseases and dysentery are spreading in the camp. There is a Georgian émigré here looking for a Georgian radio operator. Go with him, and everything will depend on your skill.’” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 75)

Indeed, according to Ebanidze, “in this camp, a Georgian officer often came looking for a radio operator.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 28)

It was this person—émigré Chirakadze—whom Ebanidze met and agreed to work for Germany and to be parachuted into Georgia. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 28) According to Ebanidze, the process of his “recruitment” was brief. Chirakadze talked with him and asked: “Have you ever been a party member?” To which Ebanidze replied no. No other questions were asked. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 76)

It appears that Chirakadze either did not know or did not take into account the fact that radio operators in the Red Army were almost always trusted Bolshevik Party members—Komsomol members, party members, or individuals connected to the security services.

After this brief “interrogation,” on August 3, 1942, Ebanidze, who, in his own words, was in a severely weakened state, was taken by Chirakadze to a residence belonging to the “Naval Intelligence” agency’s intelligence school in Simferopol. After several days of rest and proper nutrition, Ebanidze underwent a brief test in using the radio transmitter and was deemed fit to perform the duties of a radio operator. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 75)

Interestingly, unlike other members of his group, in addition to signing a cooperation agreement with the Germans, the intelligence officer gave Ebanidze the codename “Victor.” He completed a personal questionnaire and, in his own words, “thus became an agent of German intelligence.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 29)

After this, Ebanidze was sent to a special school in Simferopol, where German intelligence trained radio operators for deployment behind Red Army lines in the USSR. Along with him, twenty-one other students were trained at the school. They studied the relevant ciphers and the Morse code alphabet. Ebanidze studied for twenty days and, upon completion of his training, he and the other members of his group were sent to Georgia for deployment, departing from the city of Yevpatoria, where the so-called “Sak” aerodrome was located. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 28–29)

Another member of the German parachute group, Fichelauri, who had worked as a shepherd before the war, was drafted into the army in September 1941 from the city of Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz). He served as a private in the Red Army. On June 30, 1942, near Sevastopol, Fichelauri was wounded in the shoulder during an air raid and was captured. Initially, he was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Bakhchisarai, from where he was soon transferred to the Simferopol POW camp. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 130)

On August 1, 1942, he was approached by émigré Leo Balarjishvili, who had learned that Fichelauri spoke several languages—Georgian, Russian, Ossetian, and Ingush. Balarjishvili informed him that a group was being prepared for deployment in Georgia, which would be led by émigré Chirakadze. Consequently, Fichelauri, as a multilingual individual, was suitable for this mission. Fichelauri agreed to cooperate and, together with Durglishvili, was released and taken to Simferopol to the building housing the intelligence school. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 197)

Ten days later, one of the officers of the “Naval Intelligence” agency obtained signed cooperation agreements from Fichelauri and Durglishvili. Relevant documents in German were issued, including their photographs, stating that these individuals had the right to carry weapons and could go into the city at any time. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, pp. 148–155)

The third member of the group, Durglishvili, a resident of Tbilisi, was a Komsomol member and a trained physician. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 252) He was drafted into the army on August 26, 1941, and served as an assistant to a surgeon in a medical-sanitary battalion. On November 10, 1941, his unit was “transferred” to Sukhumi, and on December 25 of the same year, they arrived by ship in Sevastopol. There, Durglishvili was appointed assistant to the surgeon of the so-called “First Hospital.” On June 30, 1942, his unit, encircled near the coast, was captured by German forces. Durglishvili was sent to the Simferopol POW camp. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 268)

In his testimony, Durglishvili states that: “Émigrés Gogi (Giorgi) Chirakadze and Leo Balarjishvili often visited them in the prisoner-of-war camp. Chirakadze asked me, ‘My brother, will you come with me?’ to which I immediately agreed, since there was dysentery and other diseases spreading in the camp.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 268)

According to his testimony, on August 1, 1942, they were taken to Simferopol, to the Naval Intelligence building, where Ebanidze was also brought on August 3. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 269)

Durglishvili notes in his testimony that: “I went to special intelligence-diversion training together with Chirakadze and Fichelauri, while Ebanidze was studying radio work.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 269)

On August 20, 1942, Batsatsashvili was brought to Chirakadze as the fifth member of his “parachute group.” According to the materials, the former Red Army soldier Batsatsashvili was drafted into the army on August 4, 1941. He was sent from Tbilisi to the Iranian city of Prishta with Red Army units. In December 1941, he was recalled and “transferred” to Kerch, where, on May 15, Batsatsashvili was captured. According to him, he was initially placed in a prisoner-of-war camp near Simferopol, and on August 20, 1942, he was transferred to Yevpatoria. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 384)

In his testimony, Batsatsashvili did not discuss the circumstances of his transfer to Yevpatoria. He only mentions that: “I personally have the Red Army booklet of an émigré’s brother, under the name Shaliko Pitsalashvili.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 385)

The matter is that, on August 20, 1942, Batsatsashvili was taken out of the Simferopol POW camp by Chirakadze, posing as the brother of his friend Niko (Nikoloz) Pitsalashvili, in order to leave the camp. Notably, he carried a fake Red Army booklet issued by German intelligence under the Pitsalashvili surname.

The other members of the group had already completed their intelligence-diversion training and were ready for deployment in Georgia. Since Batsatsashvili joined them late, he did not undergo the relevant training. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 286)

This information is further clarified by Ebanidze in his testimonies. He begins his discussion of Batsatsashvili as follows: “As for Batsatsashvili, under the pseudonym ‘Pitsalashvili,’ he was brought to us 20 days later by émigré Chirakadze.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 77)

According to him: “Émigré Pitsalashvili had previously been flown to Batumi with his group. He told Chirakadze, ‘My brother is Plenia.’ Batsatsashvili overheard this and memorized Pitsalashvili’s name and surname, presenting himself as Pitsalashvili.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 79)

Niko (Nikoloz) Pitsalashvili’s group did not fly to Batumi; they were parachuted elsewhere in western Georgia, where a few months later they were captured and executed. These materials are significant but will be addressed in another study.

A few days after the arrival of “Pitsalashvili” (Batsatsashvili), Chirakadze’s group received the parachute equipment and departed for Sevastopol, where, according to Ebanidze, “Batsatsashvili had to admit that he was not Pitsalashvili but Batsatsashvili.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 80)

Chirakadze himself only learned the true identity of the person he believed to be Pitsalashvili when he was tied up, and someone shouted to him: “You too, Pitsalashvili!” to which he replied: “I am not Pitsalashvili, I am Batsatsashvili,” and kicked. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 81)

Thus, Chirakadze did not rescue the brother of his friend but an entirely different person, saving him from inevitable death in the German POW camp and bringing him to Georgia.

Before we begin discussing Chirakadze, it should be noted that when reading the materials preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, specifically the testimonies of members of German army-deployed parachute units in Georgia, a clear “common” motivation emerges among the émigrés who assisted these prisoners-of-war and effectively preserved their lives. The testimonies of the arrested individuals clearly show that the Georgian émigrés who entered POW camps and spoke with Georgian prisoners believed that they were fighting to liberate Georgia from the Bolsheviks.

Similar information is preserved in the testimonies of members of Chirakadze’s group. For example, Ebanidze writes in one place: “Chirakadze said that after the occupation of Georgia, a ‘government of independent Georgia’ would be formed from émigrés.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 69)

In another testimony, it is stated: “The émigré Chirakadze told me, ‘Will you come with me to work for the liberation of Georgia?’” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 75)

Another group member, Fichelauri, stated that the émigré Leo Balarjishvili told him: “He [Chirakadze], being skilled in languages, was useful in the struggle to liberate Georgia from the Bolsheviks and the Soviet authorities so that Georgia would be independent.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 197)

Notably, according to Fichelauri, after arriving in Georgia, Giorgi Chirakadze spoke with the inhabitants of the villages near their landing site, telling them that: “Georgia will be independent.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 87)

In this regard, Durglishvili’s testimony is also significant. According to him: “While in the prisoner-of-war camp, Chirakadze frequently visited the prisoners and said, ‘Our goal is, and it must be carried out in such a way, that the Georgian people do not die in these battles. We must support the Georgian people in rebelling against the local Soviet councils.’” (p. 268) Durglishvili also stated: “The Georgian émigrés demanded our assistance so that, after overthrowing the Soviets in Georgia, independence could be declared.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 268)

According to the materials, Giorgi Samsonis dze Chirakadze, the leader of the German-deployed parachute unit landed in the Ashroshan forest in the Gombori mountain area of the Telavi district, was born in 1909 in Tbilisi. He shared the ideology of the Social-Democratic Party (Mensheviks) and worked for several years as a collector on the Shorapani railway. According to his testimony, on September 2, 1930, he carried money in Khashuri but lost 20,000 maneti during travel. Unable to find the money, he returned to Shorapani, where he met neighbors – Tariel Zhghent and Valerian Glont. (Additional materials about them were not sought; their graves with these names are located in Leuville’s so-called “Georgians’ Cemetery”)

It is unclear from the testimony that they planned to emigrate abroad from the Adjara region. After a few days of waiting at the border, all three crossed into Turkey. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 450)

In Turkey, he met others who had also entered illegally from Georgia, including those sent on assignments by the leaders of the independent Georgian Republic in exile in France and who later returned. Among them, he mentions the brothers Shalva and Tite Berishvili. Shalva Berishvili was indeed in Georgia in the summer of 1930 and later in Turkey.

Chirakadze and his associates, with the help of representatives of the Georgian independent republican government in exile, moved from Turkey to France. Initially, Giorgi Chirakadze worked in a provincial town doing manual labor, then received the right to reside in France and moved to Paris. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 453)

He began his studies at an institute, which he did not complete. However, in Paris, he studied automotive mechanics and worked until 1936 as a driver for a Georgian living abroad. During this period, he also completed courses for officers in the “Russian Military Union” of the Russian White Guards and received the rank of lieutenant in the infantry. He also worked at the Renault automobile factory alongside other Georgians: Severian Chirakadze, Gigo Jordania, Shota Berezhiani, Mikheil Bakhtadze, Kolia Takhaishvili, Sergo Matikashvili, and others. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 455)

In October 1936, Chirakadze was drafted into the French army, assigned to an artillery regiment, and later went through demobilization. He was drafted again in 1939, this time into a tank unit, where, according to his testimony, he “served until the reconciliation between Germany and France.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 456)

Afterwards, he ended up in a labor camp, presumably part of a battalion composed of French soldiers. On March 10, 1941, Mikheil Kedia arrived, having gathered workers to be sent to Germany. Together with Chirakadze, Sandro Demetrashvili and Severian Urushadze were selected. They were sent to Germany, where Chirakadze began working in an auto repair workshop in Berlin. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 456)

In his testimony, Chirakadze noted that while in Germany he met Soso Gvaramadze, to whom he presented a list of 15–20 Georgian émigrés for submission to the naval intelligence sections of the German Army General Staff. In July 1941, he was summoned to the General Staff’s naval intelligence department in Stettin. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 456)
(Stettin – modern-day Szczecin, Poland; formerly part of Prussia and a German port on the Baltic Sea until 1945. In December 1940, the naval intelligence section of the military intelligence and counterintelligence organization, Abwehr, established an intelligence school there, training spies, saboteurs, and radio operators. Agents were given code names and false passports, and the training lasted six months.)

Chirakadze went to Stettin and, together with other Georgians, began studying radio transmission courses at the Abwehr naval intelligence school, which he could not complete due to poor hearing. It is noteworthy that, according to one archival file we found, his friend Niko (Nikoloz) Patsalashvili, also in the Stettin school, confirmed in his testimony that Chirakadze could not complete the course because of hearing problems. His lack of knowledge in using radio transmitters explains why he actively sought radio operators in Georgian POW camps. Other groups, organized similarly by Georgian émigrés, relied on radio operators trained at the Stettin school.

Chirakadze returned to Berlin, but in June 1942, he was summoned again to Stettin’s naval intelligence department, where he received the necessary documents and was sent to Simferopol under the command of Captain Bode, head of the Abwehr’s Black Sea naval intelligence section. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 457)

It should be noted that Giorgi Chirakadze held the rank of naval major. For this reason, his group members, with whom he was “parachuted” into Georgia, sometimes referred to him as “Major Chirakadze.”

While in Simferopol, according to his testimony, Chirakadze attempted to contact the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party (Mensheviks) in France. He even sent a letter to Valiko Inckvirvel, a member of the party’s foreign bureau, informing him that he was being sent to Georgia and requesting instructions on how to act in the event of deployment. Valiko Inckvirvel visited Simferopol and met with Chirakadze, but was unable to provide any guidance or effective assistance. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 458)

It is clear that during interrogation, Giorgi Chirakadze concealed certain information, and his testimonies alone are not sufficient to form a complete understanding of his personality. Accordingly, to provide more information and a relatively fuller picture, other sources are also presented.

Ebanoidze stated in one of his testimonies: “The émigré Chirakadze spoke to us with great pride about his heroic past, leaving Georgia for emigration, spending 11 years in France, then moving to Germany, being in Georgia in 1936, and participating in landings in Spain, Poland, and Greece.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 76)

In another testimony, it was specified that Chirakadze “arrived in Sukhumi in 1936 from France together with other émigrés and then traveled to Tbilisi to carry out a special mission. There, he convened an illegal meeting and completed the assigned task. Afterwards, he went to one of the villages in the Makharadze district, where he also celebrated. Then he departed abroad via Ochamchire.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 67)

It should be noted that in other materials, no information confirming Ebanoidze’s account could be found. It appears that this information was not accurate.

According to Chirakadze’s indictment, “Chirakadze was a resident of Berlin. Until 1930, he lived and worked in Shorapani as a railway money collector. Together with his accomplices – Tariel Zhghenti and Valerian Ghlonti (both in emigration) – he stole 65,000 maneti and emigrated abroad.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 514)

The indictment also states: “In 1939, Chirakadze was drafted from Paris into the tank ‘Death Division.’ After Germany occupied France, he was in labor camps, where he was recruited for work in Germany by the German intelligence agent Mikheil Kedia.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 514)

Investigation documents note that “Chirakadze attended the intelligence radio school in Stettin and, after arriving in Simferopol, prepared a group of prisoners for parachuting into Georgia.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 515)

According to one document, “Chirakadze, a professional driver, had been a member of the Georgian White émigré Social-Democratic organization since 1931. At the time of his arrest, he was a major of the Abwehr Black Sea naval intelligence department and head of a parachutist-saboteur group.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 516)

Holding the rank of major and serving as “head of the parachutist-saboteur group,” Chirakadze, while still in Simferopol, had already been “assigned” by the former Red Army members who were part of the group he had selected. From Fichtelauri’s testimonies, it appears that “while still in Simferopol, the group leader Gogi (Giorgi) Chirakadze instructed him, Durglishvili, and Ebanoidze to ‘report’ to the NKVD.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 236)

The former prisoners lived together in one room, which made it easier for them to “open their hearts.” Fichtelauri stated several times during the investigation: “I was the initiator of this discussion.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 343) However, before informing the group members of his plan, he first confided in Avsanjalishvili, the driver of one of the German intelligence officers stationed in Simferopol, who had previously served in the German service like him. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 238)

The latter approved of Fichtelauri’s plan to have Chirakadze “surrendered” to the NKVD after being parachuted into Georgia. Encouraged by this conversation, Fichtelauri also confided in his group members. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 240)

He also discussed the matter with former Soviet personnel who were to be deployed in other groups trained by the German intelligence in Simferopol for parachuting into Georgia. These groups were to be sent before Chirakadze’s group. Among them, he mentioned one Vardio(shvili), who on August 25, 1942, was “parachuted” into Georgia as part of one group. Fichtelauri noted that the members of this person’s group also wished to voluntarily “report to the NKVD.” According to Fichtelauri, he discussed his group’s decision with them so that “the NKVD in Georgia, those sent earlier, would be informed about his group’s plan.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 242)

Ebanoidze, for his part, stated that before being sent to Georgia by plane, he “had discussed with another group’s radio operator Bakuradze, who had been previously parachuted along with his group members, that his group intended to ‘report to the NKVD.’” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 30)

Ebanoidze also listed the individuals who were supposed to voluntarily report to the NKVD after being deployed in Georgia. Among them, he mentioned Vardio(shvili) from Tbilisi. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 40) This person was likely the same Vardio(shvili) mentioned by Fichtelauri. Notably, in this list, Ebanoidze also mentioned someone named Tsalughelashvili, who intended to report to the NKVD. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 40) According to archival materials I examined, Tsalughelashvili did indeed report to the NKVD, but was executed nonetheless.

As for why Ebanoidze, Fichtelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili hoped that they would not be executed after reporting to the NKVD, Ebanoidze’s testimony provides a notable explanation: “Since Chirakadze had been in Georgia in 1936 and might have connections here, it would be good to hand them over. Therefore, if we take such a man, we will hand him over alive; perhaps large gangs would be uncovered.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 77)

In other words, to save their own lives, the members of Chirakadze’s group were, in effect, sacrificing another person, which they succeeded in doing. The cost of this will be discussed below.

According to Ebanoidze: “Fichtelauri begged me to learn this task quickly. He told me, ‘Learn the radio work soon, or these people will kill us from hunger.’” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 77)

Soon after beginning training at the Simferopol intelligence school, Chirakadze’s group was ready to be deployed in Georgia. However, on August 22, 1942, the vehicle carrying them to the ‘Saki’ airfield met with an accident, and Ebanoidze injured his leg. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 464)

As a result, Chirakadze selected another radio operator, of Russian nationality, but the rest of the group refused to include this person. According to Ebanoidze: “The boys refused—‘we don’t trust him, he’s Russian.’ They also refused to fly with a radio operator of Armenian nationality.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 85)

It is clear that they wanted to deploy together, so they could carry out their plan more easily without a foreign person.

After Ebanoidze recovered, Chirakadze’s group departed from the ‘Saki’ airfield to Georgia on the evening of September 17, 1942. As noted above, they were supposed to be dropped at another location. Ebanoidze testified that “their group was to be parachuted near Melaani, where Georgians who had arrived earlier were waiting for them.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 27)

Fichtelauri repeated the same: “They were supposed to be parachuted into the village of Melaani, but ended up near the village of Ashroshan in the Telavi district.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 179)

It was in the airplane that the radio transmitter’s antenna was hidden—more precisely, Fichtelauri placed it under the airplane seat just before the parachute jump. Without this item, the radio operator could not have established contact with the intelligence school in Simferopol using the transmitter. This is the antenna that served as the pretext for Fichtelauri and Batsatsashvili to go to Telavi, but instead, they “reported to the NKVD.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 30)

The episode of hiding the radio transmitter’s antenna is interesting from another angle as well—the attempt by Ebanoidze to “claim credit” for the idea. In his first testimony, he claimed that he had hidden the antenna himself. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 30)

In his handwritten “autobiography-testimony,” Ebanoidze again affirmed that “I told Fichtelauri to hide the antenna upon arrival.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 90)

In reality, as the analysis of the materials shows, it was initially Fichtelauri who proposed that Chirakadze should “report to the NKVD” and it was he who hid the radio transmitter’s antenna. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 30)

The reason for emphasizing these facts will be discussed a little further below.

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On September 17, 1942, at 10 p.m., the parachute landing of Chirakadze’s group members over the forested terrain of the Gombori Pass did not occur without incidents. Two members of the group—Ebanoidze and Durglishvili—were injured. Both hurt their legs and could not walk, but in the morning, they were found and sheltered by local residents. Moreover, as the materials indicate, these individuals showed goodwill toward the German parachute group members. They were initially taken into houses, received medical treatment, assisted in finding each other, and later helped build a hut in a safe location in the forest.

Members of Chirakadze’s group testified that the local population of the villages near the Gombori Pass—the Khevsurs—were hostile toward the Soviet authorities. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 222)

When the locals learned from Chirakadze that he and his group had been sent by the Germans, instead of reporting them to the NKVD, they supported and assisted them. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 224)

The Khevsur locals took turns bringing food supplies and also provided them with various items. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 224)

After the arrest of Chirakadze’s group, the hut they had used in the forest contained Khevsur household items—a pardagi (wooden board or table), a pot, spoons, a hoe, and other objects. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 142)

The materials indicate that members of Chirakadze’s group provided the investigation with a great deal of compromising information about the local residents who had assisted them. They also discussed the agitation conducted by Chirakadze in favor of the Germans: “Chirakadze spoke to them about liberation from the Bolsheviks, promising land and weapons distribution.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 87, 228)

They also noted: “The locals treated us very well. They were impressed by Chirakadze’s agitation and were happy about the Germans’ imminent arrival.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 229)

The group’s most, so to speak, “Soviet-minded” member, a former NKVD agent known as “Sarke”—the Bolshevik Ebanoidze—stated in his testimony: “Chirakadze gathered around him the local residents who were protecting him.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 30)

In his handwritten “autobiography-testimony,” Ebanoidze explicitly listed the local population’s “crimes” against Soviet authorities and, as an experienced agent capable of independently collecting and analyzing information, wrote the following:

a) “During seven days of staying and talking with our peasants, I noticed the following: young boys, Vano, Petre, wore various military trousers and outerwear on different days. This made me suspicious—where did they get them? Could there be other parachuted people hiding there, arriving in such uniforms?”

b) “The émigré promised that in a week he would recruit two hundred men for participation in the uprising, and would supply them with weapons, and they reproached the émigré for not bringing weapons.”

c) “On September 27, the day of the émigré’s arrest, I rode a horse near the house of a peasant, Giorgi (35 years old). On the upper side of the house, I saw more than fifty sheep skins and wondered who eats so many sheep.”

d) “During one conversation, the peasant Petre told the émigré: ‘As soon as the Germans arrive, I will fire the Maxim machine gun here.’”

e) “The peasants have small revolvers. During conversations, the local Khevsurs noted that they were hiding Kakutsa Cholokashvili. Could they still be hiding Kakutsas?” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, pp. 100–101)

Ebanoidze added precisely this question to his testimony, thereby encouraging the NKVD to carry out repressive measures against the residents of the villages near the Gombori Pass.

The following local residents assisted Chirakadze’s group and later became targets of state persecution: “Giorgi Arabuli, Vano Arabuli, Petre (Peto) Arabuli, Abram Arabuli—from the village of Vashlovani; also a resident of this village named Gigauri; and another person whose name is unknown from the village of Tetritskaro.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 227) Some of these individuals were arrested by Soviet authorities, while others went into hiding in the forests.

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Chirakadze was sentenced and executed, while the members of his group, contrary to their expectations, were neither released from prison nor rewarded. They were “turned into agents” by the Soviet military counterintelligence. (Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, established April 1943) The materials contain documents signed by Ebanoidze, Fichtelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili, showing that they became so-called “informant agents” for military counterintelligence.

It is interesting to note how people were “turned into agents” in such cases. It appears that the named individuals were officially tried and each sentenced to five years in prison. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 518)

This was a relatively lenient sentence because most of the people parachuted into Georgia by the Germans, even though many were registered by the NKVD, were executed. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1245)

The “leniency” was also reflected in the fact that from May 1943, all four—Ebanoidze, Fichtelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili—were transferred to the authority of military counterintelligence and in 1944 were released from prison. To anticipate the events, their transfer to military counterintelligence occurred simultaneously with Chirakadze’s execution.

Around the same time—June 1943—the “four” gave their consents for espionage activities to military counterintelligence. This document, which they signed regarding cooperation with military counterintelligence, was called a “memorandum.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, p. 121)

The preserved “memorandums” indicate: “Case #3251, Directorate of Military Counterintelligence.” On the cover of each, it reads: “Confirmed simultaneously with the indictment.” The document is in the form of a questionnaire listing the person’s surname, first name, social origin, party affiliation, charges, etc. In the memorandums completed for the above individuals, it is noted: “Participant in the German parachutist group, parachuted into Georgian territory for intelligence and insurgent activities behind the Red Army lines.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, p. 121)

Paragraph 12 of the document directly shows what the “memorandum” actually represented: “Can the named person be turned (recruited) and for what purpose?” In response, the relevant column states: “It is to be considered acceptable that, after landing, the person voluntarily reports to the NKVD organ and provides assistance in the matter of capturing the leader of the parachutist group, Chirakadze. Accordingly, recruitment is possible.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, p. 122)

In paragraph 13, it asks: “What special requirements should be considered when recruiting the person as an agent?” Here, it specifies from which individual or group the recruited person should be isolated. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, p. 122)

This was likely to prevent the accidental disclosure of the person’s espionage activities. For example, if a local who had been “turned” by the above-mentioned “four” met already-arrested individuals in prison cells, it would automatically risk exposing them as agents of military counterintelligence.

By a military counterintelligence decision dated January 12, 1944, Ebanoidze, Fichtelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili had their pre-trial detention counted as time served, and by January 22 they were released from prison. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 1, p. 532)

The materials also preserve their handwritten declarations dated February 1944: “I, the undersigned (here the relevant name is written—T.S.), am obliged not to disclose the questions and issues posed to me by military counterintelligence, as well as my responses, during my detention and stay at the military counterintelligence directorate. I am warned that violation of this ‘declaration’ will result in accountability according to military regulations.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 5, pp. 36, 38, 120)

Thus, while in prison, the named individuals performed various tasks for military counterintelligence, and apparently, after their release, they continued to “work” to identify and expose their compatriots who had served in the German army—so-called “informant agents.” These were people who had served in the German army and, fearing possible arrest due to compromising material about them or after being arrested, agreed to cooperate in exchange for benefits such as early release or sentence reduction. Their task was to detect and expose former comrades who had fought in the German army. This is directly reflected in the materials from Fichtelauri’s re-trial in 1945.

According to archival documents, Fichtelauri was re-arrested in January 1945. Specifically, the military counterintelligence investigator’s decision dated January 25, 1945, states: “Fichtelauri’s case, previously tried in 1943 as a German intelligence agent parachuted into Georgia in 1942, was considered: Fichtelauri was arrested on Georgian territory and, after serving his sentence, was used for secret military counterintelligence tasks and special assignments, but he did not justify himself in this work.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 1)

The reason for Fichtelauri’s “failure to justify himself” appears in other materials. One document notes: “Fichtelauri revealed himself as a Soviet counterintelligence agent to foreigners. Additionally, on January 19, 1945, he expressed anti-Soviet views to military counterintelligence officers and praised Hitler.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 4)

Yes—no more, no less—the very same Fichtelauri, who had been the initiator of Chirakadze’s group voluntarily reporting to the NKVD in Simferopol, for some reason at the end of the war began praising Hitler. The question arises: why?

The answer must be sought in the following: regarding the re-arrested Fichtelauri, the investigator writes: “During Fichtelauri’s interrogation, the accused admitted guilt in being a secret collaborator and revealed himself, and, while intoxicated, made threats toward the leadership of military counterintelligence.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 13)

As it appears, Fichtelauri expressed threatening and insulting remarks in none other than a central district of Tbilisi, at the military counterintelligence building located at the then-Plekhanov Avenue, now David Aghmashenebeli Avenue. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, pp. 9, 13)

Presumably, such behavior was a protest against his “agent duties.”

The archival documents specify Fichtelauri’s “agent duties”—they explicitly state that he was a so-called “informant agent,” that is, a category of secret agent used by military counterintelligence at the time. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, pp. 9, 13)

Interestingly, and somewhat ironically, the materials also note: “After completing his sentence in March 1944, Fichtelauri voluntarily reported to the military counterintelligence directorate and expressed his willingness to assist military counterintelligence in exposing enemy agents known to him.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 9)

The irony lies in the fact that the memorandum did not state that reporting voluntarily after serving a sentence automatically made someone a counterintelligence agent. The memorandum establishing an individual as an agent took effect alongside the court sentence. Therefore, his voluntary reporting after serving the sentence as a supposed agent was false information. It is unclear who required such a note to be made, especially since these documents were classified and, at the time, even military counterintelligence officers had no right to view them except under “absolute necessity.”

Based on testimony from various witnesses, including his wife, to whom he admitted being a counterintelligence agent, as well as from counterintelligence staff present during his “performance” at the directorate building, Fichtelauri was tried and, as a former “secret (covert) collaborator,” sentenced to five years in prison. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, pp. 9–11)

No additional interesting information about other members of the group, Durglishvili and Batsatsashvili, appears in the archival documents. However, Ebanoidze is mentioned several times, especially in later materials compared to the period in question.

These are documents dated 1985, concerning correspondence between Ebanoidze and high- and mid-level officers of the State Security Committee (SUK) of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic at that time.

In the first 1985 letter, addressed to the head of the Georgian SSR State Security Committee, Inauri, Ebanoidze writes that he is “a representative of the sabotage group whom we brought and handed over to your organ, the émigré Chirakadze.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 27)

In his words: “I was at your disposal for one and a half years, where I received assignments—often I was in cells where those detained were sometimes not given food. As you know, I had to endure this and I did not receive what was normally due to me.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 27)

In a second letter, Ebanoidze writes: “I was released in 1944 as sick. I was brought to security at Safarov’s place; I remember Kutsiava, Dolabegishvili, Kochlavashvili, and others were there. They wished me health, and I returned to my family.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 37)

Analysis of the materials shows that he returned to his home district and village not as a “traitor to the homeland” but as a loyal and acceptable person to the Soviet authorities: “I returned to my district as a history teacher and, after returning from the war, carried out all assignments from the security officers.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 37)

Thus, Ebanoidze continued his activity as a “secret collaborator”—an agent—but no longer as an “informant agent,” rather in the category of an “agent-informant.”

In the letters he wrote in 1985, Ebanoidze repeatedly praised himself as the person who handed over Chirakadze to the authorities. Why did he praise himself, and why did he write letters to the head of the Georgian SSR State Security Committee, Inauri?

The letters show that his goal was to receive a pension supplement of 20 maneti. He sent letters to the State Security Committee for precisely this reason. The issue was that in the relevant “sick leave form,” where it should have been noted that he had received a wound or became ill during the war, this information was not recorded.

He requested that illnesses suffered during imprisonment in 1943–1944 and a throat surgery performed in prison be recorded as having occurred during “participation in the Great Patriotic War.” He was not only refused the 20-maneti pension supplement but was also told that his “status as a participant in the Great Patriotic War” might be canceled. Therefore, he wrote to Inauri: “For a 71-year-old man, a 20-maneti pension increase means a lot. Secondly, what will people say?” In another letter, he wrote: “The case of my parachute arrival is kept in their organ, and that 20-maneti supplement was certainly due to me.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6/1265, Case 42, Vol. 2, p. 34)

From the content of the letters, it is clear that Ebanoidze first addressed this issue to the heads of the local security organs, whose orders he “executed faithfully,” but they “did nothing.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 37)

His request was ignored even by the leadership of the State Security Committee of Georgia. In response to Ebanoidze’s letters, the State Security Committee of Georgia sent a letter, written in Russian, to the head of the relevant district security office, in which his request was explicitly denied. The letter reads: “Ebanoidze voluntarily handed over the traitor Chirakadze together with the group of saboteurs.” At the same time, the district security chief was asked to explain to Ebanoidze “that his claim had no connection with the war and that the 20-maneti pension supplement was not due to him.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 47)

Thus, Ebanoidze—the loyal servant of the authorities who “carried out all assignments of the security officers until old age”—was dismissed from the State Security Committee with such a refusal. A resolution in Russian was made on the above-mentioned Russian-language document: “On October 24, 1985, Ebanoidze was presented with a response, to which he was dissatisfied and stated that he would write an appeal addressed to the head of the State Security Committee of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 42/1265, Vol. 2, p. 48)

What happened afterward is not evident from the documents, but this is sufficient to form an impression of the former Soviet prisoners mentioned in the study.

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Regarding “émigré Chirakadze,” it should be noted that the aforementioned archival file does not contain material on the execution of Giorgi Chirakadze. Therefore, the date of the death sentence, the exact date of execution, and other details were unclear. The reason for my interest in this issue was stated at the beginning of the research: I wanted to determine how accurately the oral history preserved in the memories of Telavi residents corresponded to reality.

Initial official information about Chirakadze’s execution was found on an internet site containing various materials on the activities of the USSR state security organs. (Статьи и публикации » Органы государственной безопасности СССР в годы Великой отечественной войне » Том3 - Книга вторая (01.07.1942 - 31.12.1942) http://mozohin.ru/article/a-141.html)

Presumably based on documents preserved in the archives of some USSR security body, one source referring to the period of the Second World War notes: “On September 27, 1942, in the Telavi district, the German parachutist and Georgian Menshevik Chirakadze, who was sent on a mission to establish contacts with former members of anti-Soviet parties in Georgia, was arrested. With their assistance, he was to carry out armed rebellion and sabotage acts. He was also to collect military-intelligence information and transmit it to the enemy via radio. On March 13, 1943, by a special meeting of the USSR NKVD, Chirakadze was sentenced to the maximum penalty—execution.” (Статьи и публикации » Органы государственной безопасности СССР в годы Великой отечественной войне » Том3 - Книга вторая (01.07.1942 - 31.12.1942) http://mozohin.ru/article/a-141.html)

As for the specific date of Giorgi Chirakadze’s execution, this information was found in the archival file on Vakhtangadze. He is mentioned in one of Chirakadze’s interrogation protocols. Further research in the archive revealed a file that also contains references to Chirakadze. The creation date of these documents is 1962. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 45303)

The documents note that in the 1930s, Vakhtangadze was a “member of the White-émigré Social-Democratic organization in Georgia” and knew his fellow émigrés at the time, including Giorgi Chirakadze.

The file also includes brief biographical information on Chirakadze, which, according to the analysis of these and other materials, was extracted from the above-mentioned archival case: his study at the Stettin intelligence school, his formation of a group in Simferopol to be sent to Georgia, and more. It is noted that “the members of Chirakadze’s group were not focused on fulfilling the Germans’ tasks, and on September 27, 1942, he was arrested with the assistance of Ebanoidze, Fichtelauri, Durglishvili, and Batsatsashvili. By the decision of the special meeting of the USSR NKVD on March 13, 1943, Chirakadze was sentenced to execution. The decision was carried out on May 13, 1943.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 6, Case 45303, p. 29)

Archival materials on the circumstances of the execution are rare. This is partly due to the nature of the sources: contemporary archival materials are official documents of law enforcement structures, mainly containing “dry” factual information. Nevertheless, these materials were found in the Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive of Georgia. They allow, to some extent, a reconstruction of the full picture of this particular case. (Special thanks to the staff of the MIA archive for their assistance in locating these documents.)

First of all, it should be noted that according to the laws at the time, Chirakadze’s execution should have been carried out shortly after the death sentence was pronounced, but the execution was temporarily postponed. This is evidenced by a secret letter dated April 21, 1943, which states: “Due to operational needs, please postpone the execution of the sentence.” (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 27)

Another document was also found, which reveals that initially Giorgi Chirqadze’s execution was planned to take place in Tbilisi, in the NKVD’s internal prison. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 29)

On May 11, 1943, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, Rafava, sent the following order to Captain Mughalashvili, head of the NKVD’s internal prison:
*“In accordance with the decision of the Special Council under the USSR NKVD of March 13, 1943, and directive No. 8/13237 of the USSR NKVD of 1943, you are hereby ordered to carry out the sentence—the highest measure of social protection, execution by shooting—against the following person:

1.                Grigol Samsonovich Chirakadze, born in 1909, resident of Tbilisi, émigré, with secondary education, at the time of arrest leader of a group of German parachutist-spies. The sentence is to be carried out on the night of May 12–13, 1943.”*
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 29)

The document is crossed out with pen or pencil.

Already the next day, on May 12, 1943, the People’s Commissar Rafava sent a new order to Mughalashvili, the head of the NKVD internal prison. This document repeats the wording of the May 11 order, except now Mughalashvili, together with Kvashal, head of the Telavi NKVD, was instructed to carry out the sentence—“the highest measure of social protection—execution by shooting”—publicly, directly in the Telavi district, at the site where the German parachutist had been captured. Prior to the execution, Chirakadze was to be photographed in two copies. (Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 24)

The document further states:
*“At the place of execution, the condemned is to be escorted under reinforced guard, without informing the wider population. At the execution, only 15–20 people who took part in the arrest of the parachutist are to be present. Before the execution, it must be explained to the workers that the captured German spy-parachutist has been sentenced to the highest measure—execution—and particular emphasis must be placed on the fact that after landing he did not voluntarily surrender to the Soviet authorities with repentance.

Under the command of a senior or mid-level officer, a detachment of 6 to 10 men from NKVD troops—tested fighter Communists and Komsomol members—must be assigned.

The execution shall be carried out by rifle volley with the command: ‘Fire at the traitor to the Motherland!’

After the sentence is carried out, the body is to be buried at the site, and two copies of the act of execution are to be prepared and submitted to the NKVD.”*
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 20) (see Document #5)

Thus, according to oral testimonies, these were precisely the words read out before Chirakadze’s execution at “Gigo’s Hill” in Telavi. I believe it can now be confidently stated that Chirakadze’s final outcry in response was indeed real, since otherwise it would not have been preserved in popular memory.

Moreover, in these materials there is another document that directly specifies and, one could say, completes the story of Giorgi Chirakadze’s execution. The document was signed by Aleksandre Kochlavashvili—later a historian, but at that time head of the Counterintelligence Department of the Georgian SSR People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. On May 11, 1943, he wrote the following to Morozov, head of the First Department of the Georgian SSR NKVD:
“I consider it expedient that the execution of the German agent-parachutist, émigré G.S. Chirakadze, be carried out in the Telavi district, at the site ‘Gigo’s Mta-Gora,’ near Nadikvreti.”
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Archive, Fond 12, Case 040, p. 25) (see Document #6)

It was presumably this instruction that determined Chirakadze’s execution would take place not in prison, but in Telavi.

As we have seen, this document directly indicates the place of execution. This is one of the rare cases where we have a written Soviet-era source specifying the exact location of an execution.

Archival materials have preserved the documentary confirmation of Chiraqadze’s execution. This is the so-called “Execution Act”:

**“Top Secret
May 13, 1943. Telavi.

We, the undersigned – the head of the NKVD prison, Mughalashvili, the head of the Telavi NKVD, Kvashali, and the prosecutor of Telavi, Comrade Gigauri – have drawn up the following act: that, in accordance with the order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, Commissar of the Third Rank Rafava, dated May 12, 1943, the sentence of the Special Board attached to the NKVD of the USSR, dated March 13, 1943 – the supreme measure of social protection, execution by shooting – was carried out on the convict:

1.                Chiraqadze Grigol Samson’s son, born in 1909, resident of the city of Tbilisi, emigrant, with a secondary education.

The sentence was executed publicly on May 13, 1943, on the spot known as “Gigo’s Mountain.”

The act has been drawn up in two copies for the Head of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD.

Head of the NKVD Internal Prison, Captain Mughalashvili
Head of the Telavi NKVD, Kvashali
Prosecutor of Telavi District, Gigauri.”**
(Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Fund 12, Case 040, Page 26)

Thus, as we can see, the oral history preserved among the population of Telavi about the circumstances of Giorgi Chiraqadze’s execution on Gigo’s Hill on May 13, 1943, can be said with certainty to correspond to the truth.

I could not trace Giorgi Chiraqadze’s relatives; apparently, he left no descendants. Yet his name has remained in history precisely because of the words he cried out to his executioners before the shooting: “I love Georgia, I am not a traitor… History will say whether I am the traitor, or you are!”

Yes, history will certainly speak – or perhaps it already has. It is now for the reader to judge…

November 23, 2021